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INTRODUCTION 
Last year, Facebook found a new way to irritate its users.  Facebook, 
in collaboration with researchers at Cornell University, published the 
now-famous “Emotion Contagion” study, which examined whether 
users’ own status updates were influenced by the emotional valence of 
the messages in their News Feeds.1  To do so, Facebook altered the 
News Feed algorithm for a large, randomly selected sample of 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law; B.S., 
Yale College; J.D., Yale Law School.  The author is exceedingly grateful for the feedback on 
early drafts by Derek Bambauer and Chris Robertson.  Gratitude is also owed to Alexander Tsesis 
and the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for the support and opportunity to present this 
research. 
1. Adam D.I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion 
Through Social Networks, 111 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 8788, 8788 (2014). 
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Facebook users. 
When news broke about Facebook’s surreptitious study, scholars 
came out in droves to denounce the practices.  James Grimmelmann 
was the most outspoken critic, insisting that the Facebook study was not 
only immoral but also illegal.2  Other legal scholars have questioned the 
practices followed by the Emotion Contagion study authors, too, and 
most proposed extending the legal requirements for Institutional Review 
Boards (“IRBs”) to private corporations.3 
This Essay comes to a starkly different conclusion.  Although the 
strong reactions to Facebook’s research are perfectly natural, they are 
not particularly thoughtful.  And they steer us toward policies that are 
downright anti-intellectual.  The Facebook Emotion Contagion study 
reveals that our unexamined intuitions about social science lead to 
bizarre legal and ethical rules.  Our reactions are harshest when the 
research is the most legitimate; the most criticized studies are the ones 
performed by academics, that use the most methodologically sound 
form of investigation, and that distribute their costs and burdens 
evenhandedly across society.  Worse still, the social stigma and legal 
sanctions apply only when researchers share their findings with the 
general public.  The moral outrage surrounding the Facebook Emotion 
Contagion study encapsulates all of these perverse qualities. 
This Essay begins with a short description of the Facebook study and 
the hostile reaction it received from the public and from legal scholars.  
Parts II and III critique the criticism, finding that the moral indignation 
 
2. James Grimmelmann, Illegal, Immoral, and Mood-Altering: How Facebook and OkCupid 
Broke the Law When They Experimented on Users, MEDIUM (Sept. 23, 2014), https://medium 
.com/@JamesGrimmelmann/illegal-unethical-and-mood-altering-8b93af772688. 
3. Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 97 (2013) (recommending something more dynamic and less demanding than full 
“Common Rule” IRB review for corporate research); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Enter the 
Philosophers: Ethical Review Boards for Innovative Data Use by Corporations, 13 COLO. TECH. 
L.J. 333 (2015) (fleshing out Calo’s proposal and providing valuable background on the live 
debate about corporate social science research); Frank Pasquale, Social Science in an Era of 
Corporate Big Data, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 4, 2014), http://concurringopinions.com/arch 
ives/2014/07/social-science-in-an-era-of-corporate-big-data.html; Daniel Solove, Facebook’s 
Psych Experiment: Consent, Privacy, and Manipulation, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/facebook-psych-experiment_b_5545372.html (last updated Aug. 
30, 2014, 5:59 AM).  Outside the legal discipline, there is a little more diversity of opinion.  See, 
e.g., Michele Meyer, Two Cheers for Corporate Experimentation: The A/B Illusion and the 
Virtues of Data-Driven Innovation, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 273 (2015) (defending the Emotion 
Contagion study from critiques); Tal Yarkoni, In Defense of Facebook, TAL YARKONI (July 1, 
2015), http://www.talyarkoni.org/blog/2014/06/28/in-defense-of-facebook/ (defending the 
Emotion Contagion study from some critiques). 
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is misplaced, and that the anticipated problems are best addressed 
through direct regulations of risky conduct and special relationships.  
Part IV shows that the law regulating research is overbroad.  It obstructs 
research that poses little risk to its subjects or society.  Part V briefly 
sketches a proposal to reform research policy so that it can 
simultaneously support the production of knowledge while protecting 
research subjects from harm. 
I.  THE STUDY 
One of the more peculiar aspects of the Facebook research 
controversy is its relatively innocuous origin. 
Facebook worked with researchers at Cornell University to 
investigate whether our mood is affected by the mood of our friends as 
expressed by the Facebook status updates that appear in the News 
Feed.4  The researchers took a sample of roughly 700,000 randomly 
selected Facebook users and divided them into two related randomized 
control trials.5  The control groups for both experiments saw the usual 
News Feed on their home pages—exactly the same News Feed they 
would see if they were not in the experiment at all.6  The experimental 
groups saw News Feeds for which either positive or negative emotional 
expressions by their friends were reduced by 10%.7 
The researchers found that sure enough, people who saw fewer 
negative postings were less likely—slightly less likely—to post a 
negative status update.8  Likewise, people who saw fewer positive 
postings were less likely to post a positive update and more likely to 
post a negative one.9  It is not clear that this is evidence of an actual 
change in mood rather than an effect on expression,10 and the effect is 
small in absolute terms.  But it is an interesting and statistically 
significant effect all the same. 
The Emotion Contagion study was just one of several experiments 
that Facebook has facilitated, and it is not all that obvious why this 
particular one attracted the ire that it did.11  Other studies have had 
 
4. Kramer et al., supra note 1, at 8788. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. George Lawton, Why Is It Ethical Not to Test for Emotional Impact?, TORQUE (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://torquemag.io/ethical-test-emotional-impact/ [hereinafter Lawton]. 
11. Others have wondered the same thing.  Danah Boyd, What Does the Facebook Experiment 
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much more consequential findings.  For example, a study published in 
the prestigious journal Nature demonstrated the potential power that 
social networks could wield in democratic elections.12  The “Poked to 
Vote” study13 compared a control group of Facebook users who saw a 
generic, informational “Get Out the Vote” message to an experimental 
group who saw a social stimulus—the same “Get Out the Vote” 
message placed next to pictures of six friends who had reported that 
they voted.  The experimental group was very slightly more likely to 
vote than the control group.14 
In terms of substance, the Poked to Vote study probably has more 
potential for use and abuse than the Emotion Contagion study, but for 
whatever reason, it was the Emotion Contagion study that captured the 
imaginations and fears of the public. 
Most of the commentary criticizing the Facebook Emotion Contagion 
study raised objections about the ethics of the research process—
specifically that the study authors did not provide effective notice and 
choice to the study participants.15  The lack of informed consent has 
both privacy and research ethics implications. 
First, proceeding without informed consent violated the privacy 
principle of “respect for context.”  This foundational principle of 
privacy policy urges data collectors to use data only for the purpose for 
which it was collected.16  The Facebook Emotion Contagion study 
arguably violated this principle when it repurposed status updates for 
something other than Facebook’s existing or anticipated services. 
Second, proceeding without informed consent also violated autonomy 
principles that undergird modern research ethics.  Facebook secretly 
imposed an intervention in the experimental subjects’ lives, and 
consequently the subjects had less knowledge and control over their 
domains than they had assumed. 
 
Teach Us: Growing Anxiety About Data Manipulation, MEDUM (July 1, 2014), 
https://medium.com/message/what-does-the-facebook-experiment-teach-us-c858c08e287f. 
12. Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political 
Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295 (2012). 
13. Sinan Aral, Poked to Vote, 489 NATURE 212 (2012) (introducing the study under the title 
“Poked to Vote”). 
14. Bond et al., supra note 12. 
15. Solove, supra note 3. 
16. WILLIS H. WARE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, 
COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, at XX (1973) [hereinafter HEW 
REPORT] (“There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him obtained for 
one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.”). 
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Because both the privacy and autonomy critiques run into problems 
in the context of potentially valuable social science and public health 
research—problems that I will elaborate in the next two Parts—the 
discourse on Facebook’s Emotion Contagion study eventually turned to 
and settled on alleged violations of federal law that regulates IRB 
review.17 
The next three Parts will examine the validity of the process-related 
complaints directed at Facebook and its collaborators.  The actual 
findings in the Facebook study were rarely challenged, perhaps because 
the effects are small and unsurprising.  But I will also comment on what 
law can do if we become concerned about how the findings of a study 
can be misused. 
II.  PRIVACY 
Most privacy laws and policy guidance documents embrace the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) developed several decades 
ago in a report written by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare.18  One of the principles embraced in the code of FIPPs 
restricts data producers from repurposing data that was originally 
collected for some other purpose, unless the data subject has provided 
consent.19  This principle of purpose limitation or respect for context 
was incorporated into President Obama’s proposed Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights20 and is regularly embraced in the Federal Trade 
Commission’s privacy guidance documents.21  The Facebook study 
presumably violated the respect for context principle.  Research like 
Facebook’s takes data that was legitimately collected for one purpose 
and uses it for some other unexpected inquiry.  Strict adherence to the 
FIPPs would therefore require Facebook to give effective notice and 
choice before studying the data it collected about its users for anything 
other than basic service improvements. 
 
17. Grimmelmann, supra note 2. 
18. HEW REPORT, supra note 16, at xx; see also ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION 
PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY (Feb. 11, 2015), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory 
.pdf (providing a history of FIPPs). 
19. HEW REPORT, supra note 16, at xx (“There must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other 
purposes without his consent.”). 
20. WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF 
RIGHTS ACT OF 2015, at,8 (2015). 
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS 38–39 (2012). 
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In the context of public health and social science research, the respect 
for context principle presents two insurmountable problems.  The first is 
practical.  The original context or purpose of data collection is usually 
ambiguous, as the Facebook Emotion Contagion study itself 
demonstrates.  If the test for original purpose is determined by the users’ 
actual understanding, then the public surprise and objection to the 
Emotion Contagion study is good evidence that analysis of Facebook 
users’ moods did not serve a proper business purpose.  But if the test is 
an objective one—what a Facebook user should understand, the original 
purpose could sweep much broader.  After all, most people who have 
thought at all about Facebook’s News Feed algorithm understand that 
Facebook curates the status updates that appear in the News Feed all the 
time.22  Perhaps consumers should anticipate that Facebook would 
redesign its News Feed algorithm from time to time based on our 
reactions and responsive behaviors to the current feed.  If so, we could 
expect Facebook to use our data to assess the effects of the current 
algorithm and optimize the program for some goal. 
Second, and more importantly, societies like ours that have come to 
demand efficient and evidence-based services cannot comply with the 
respect for context principle.  Good research has to be disrespectful of 
context.  Academic research frequently looks for ways to repurpose data 
to make novel insights.  For example, a recent study published in the 
journal JAMA Internal Medicine used hospital discharge data to 
examine what happens when a large portion of the most highly skilled 
cardiologists in the country leave their posts for a few days to attend a 
national conference.23  The results were unexpected.24  But so was the 
research itself for the patients whose data was included in the study.  
Those patients would not have anticipated at the time of their 
hospitalization that they were part of a natural experiment.  They likely 
were not even aware that their admitting hospital’s staffing had been 
affected by an annual conference. 
Companies routinely repurpose data for research, not only to 
optimize their own business, but also for the pursuit of generalizable 
knowledge.  For example, Google has used search terms to identify 
 
22. Victor Luckerson, Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually Works, TIME (July 9, 
2015), http://time.com/3950525/facebook-news-feed-algorithm/. 
23. Ashutosh B. Jena et al., Mortality and Treatment Patterns Among Patients Hospitalized 
with Acute Cardiovascular Conditions During Dates of National Cardiology Meetings, 175 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 237 (2015). 
24. Id. (finding that mortality was greatly reduced for the most severe heart problems). 
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previously unknown side effects of prescription drugs.25  OkCupid has 
used the data from its dating website to reveal all sorts of interesting 
things about human behavior.26 
Nearly all of the most important social science has relied on 
repurposed data.  A sudden enforcement of the respect for context 
privacy principle would grind research, as we know it, to a halt.  Given 
the social costs at stake, it is not surprising that just about every privacy 
law using FIPPs for its backbone has also incorporated a research 
exception.27 
Nevertheless, the respect for context critique will continue to fester in 
the privacy literature as long as data is collected and studied without a 
subject’s consent.  The objection to repurposing data will not go away, 
no matter how impractical, because the privacy impulse is deeply 
imbedded in human nature.  We simply do not like to be studied.  
Humans have natural aversion and distrust to the accumulation of 
knowledge by others who may use it to our disadvantage.  Our aversion 
to study is as old as the Old Testament.  God punished King David with 
a plague on his people, not because of King David’s conquests, 
violence, and adultery, but because he had the hubris to take a census.28  
That kind of social information apparently belonged to God alone.  We 
mortals were meant to live in mutual ignorance about one another. 
I raise all this not to push any strong agenda against privacy in all of 
its forms, but simply to acknowledge that conversations about research 
ethics exist against the backdrop of instinctive distrust.  Our natural 
aversion to involuntary study consistently drifts through the 
commentary on research-related privacy without much reflection, but 
the instinct may not be logical, and may not serve us well.  In our 
cooperative and interdependent society, data repurposing for social 
 
25. John Markoff, Unreported Side Effects of Drugs Are Found Using Internet Search Data, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/science/unreported 
-side-effects-of-drugs-found-using-internet-data-study-finds.html?_r=0. 
26. Christian Rudder, Race and Attraction, 2009-2014, OKTRENDS (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/race-attraction-2009-2014/.  OkCupid researchers have shown 
that implicit racial bias affects the earliest stages of courtship.  Id.  They have also published less 
depressing findings, like evidence that people still care about grammar.  Id.  Initial messages are 
much less likely to receive a response when they use the letter “U” instead of “you,” for example.  
Id.  Public health data is collected and disseminated for a wide variety of research, and the 
researchers sometimes use the data for novel purposes.  Id. 
27. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2015) (federal regulation permitting the release of data 
without consent for research purposes). 
28. 2 Samuel 24:10 (David immediately felt guilt for “numbering the people”). 
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science is overwhelmingly beneficial.29 
The study of historical data—that is, data that was already collected 
for some other reason and examined for research purposes after the 
fact—raises fewer legal and ethical problems than designed, 
premeditated experiments.  The next Part will explore the concerns 
raised about Facebook’s deliberate, surreptitious intervention. 
III. MANIPULATION 
The Facebook Emotion Contagion study posed an intervention.  They 
changed the News Feed algorithm for the Facebook users who were 
unwittingly selected into the experimental groups.  Is the intervention a 
source of legitimate criticism for this style of research? 
Some commenters and reporters have pointed out that corporate 
experimentation is not at all unusual.30  Controlled studies of changes to 
the way a firm conducts its business are an entirely normal part of our 
metrics-driven economy.  Google regularly experiments with the 
placement, phrasing, and design of its web pages.31  One graphic 
designer tendered a noisy resignation when he got tired of the testing 
Google did to figure out which of forty-one shades of blue had the most 
effective click-through rate.32  And, of course, Google is in a state of 
perpetual testing with its flagship search algorithm such that the results 
are endlessly tweaked and refined based on the responses of its users.  
Consumer experimentation was hardly invented by Internet firms.  Well 
before Google, retail spaces meticulously studied purchase data and foot 
traffic information to test various layouts for their stores and shelves.33  
Surreptitious experimentation is prolific. 
Still, the fact that a practice is frequently done is not an adequate 
justification if the practice strikes many people as insulting or harmful.  
A normative defense of secret experimentation requires more.  
On closer inspection, research ethics do not seem to be particularly 
 
29. Jane Yakowitz (Bambauer), Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2012) (discussing the benefits of repurposing data for the creation of public research databases). 
30. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, The Facebook Experiment: Gambling? In This Casino?, 
RE/CODE (July 2, 2014), http://recode.net/2014/07/02/the-facebook-experiment-is-there-gambling 
-in-this-casino/. 
31. Lawton, supra note 10. 
32. Douglas Bowman, Goodbye, Google, STOPDESIGN (Mar. 20, 2009), http://stopdesign.com/ 
archive/2009/03/20/goodbye-google.html. 
33. See generally VILMA BARR & CHARLES E. BROUDY, DESIGNING TO SELL (1986) 
(providing guidelines for designing retail space layouts based in part on purchase data and foot 
traffic information). 
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well designed to enhance public welfare.  This Part will show first that 
research ethics cause identical conduct to be treated differently—and 
with more suspicion—when the actor intends to learn while engaging in 
the conduct.  This distinction is obviously in tension with any society 
committed to scientific discovery and evidence-based decision making.  
Nevertheless, research may motivate conduct that has a propensity to 
cause harm, so subsequent Sections consider the potential harms from 
conducting secret research.  I ultimately conclude that surreptitious 
research does not deserve the overwhelming skepticism and resentment 
it gets. 
A. Intervention Defined 
Research ethicists and federal law define a research intervention (or 
manipulation) as “manipulations of the subject or the subject’s 
environment that are performed for research purposes.”34  It is a 
purpose-driven test; anything done in order to produce generalizable 
knowledge will trigger ethical obligations in today’s culture of 
responsible research. 
Consequently, the scope of research is vast, and covers scenarios with 
vastly different consequences.  A deranged doctor who prescribes a 
dangerous drug to a perfectly healthy patient just to see whether healthy 
patients experience the same side effects as sick patients is engaged in 
research.  But so is the elementary school teacher who tries two 
different in-class activities on two sections of students in order to see 
which activity produces better learning and test outcomes. 
Given this great heterogeneity in the conduct that can constitute 
research, the law and ethical recommendations have naturally adapted to 
require more process for some types of research than for others.  But 
everything that falls in this definition of “intervention” technically 
counts as surreptitious research if it is done without advance notice and 
an opportunity to withdraw.  So the simple rule that the critics of the 
Facebook study propose—the “no secret research” rule—must address 
some negative qualities that all research interventions share.  And the 
only thing that all research shares is an intention to produce 
generalizable knowledge. 
The next three Sections will consider the types of adverse 
consequences the intent to perform research might have.  Section B will 
consider conflicts of interest, Section C considers concrete risks of 
 
34. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2015) (defining “intervention”). 
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physical or financial harm to research subjects, and Section D considers 
the harms to autonomy and dignity interests of the research subjects.  
These are the potential harms that motivate the current customs in 
research ethics; they are all captured to some degree by the concept of 
beneficence—the duty for researchers to protect the autonomy and 
wellbeing of their research subjects.35 
Some of the risks considered below are serious risks some of the 
time, but none of them are risks all of the time.  Among the sort of 
studies that are most commonly conducted by Facebook and other 
social media companies, the serious harms that research occasionally 
causes are exceedingly unlikely.  Thus, serious research risks can and 
should be managed through laws focused on the preexisting relationship 
between the researcher and subject or focused on the foreseeability of 
harm to others (regardless of the relationship).  When regulation is 
triggered instead by merely entertaining a research purpose, it is wildly 
over-inclusive, needlessly impeding useful research. 
B. Does a Research Purpose Cause a Conflict of Interest? 
Research ethics is often conceived as a species of conflict of interest 
law.  If a researcher is changing the subject’s environment or 
intervening in some other way for the purpose of learning about the 
subject’s reaction, then the researcher may not be conforming his 
conduct in accordance to the subject’s best interest.  Even if the 
researcher hopes to conduct his practices in a way that puts his subjects’ 
interests first and the research interests second, testing only the effects 
of various interventions that seem ex ante to be in the subjects’ best 
interest, the secondary research purpose can corrupt the primary goal of 
serving the subject.  A researcher’s judgment can be biased by the 
research goals.  For these reasons, an external and independent reviewer 
is recommended to ensure that the subject’s interests are kept in mind.36 
This logic is deeply imbedded in the law and culture of American 
research, but it is not well thought out.  It presupposes a fiduciary 
responsibility that all researchers owe to their subjects not only to not 
harm them (after all, we all have that legal and moral responsibility37), 
 
35. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 23194 (1979) [hereinafter THE BELMONT 
REPORT]. 
36. Id. at 23195–96. 
37. This is the core concept of negligence law, which assigns liability to any actor whose 
conduct exposes others, even strangers, to unnecessary or unjustified risk of harm.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 (2013). 
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but to positively serve them and maximize their wellbeing.  This goes 
well beyond the responsibilities, both moral and legal, that people 
ordinarily owe to one another while interacting.  And yet, there is no 
sound reason that an actor should have to become a fiduciary—a 
guardian over another’s best interests—when the actor has a desire to 
engage in scientific discovery if he could avoid that responsibility by 
performing the exact same conduct with a different purpose—a purpose 
to profit, for example, or to serve his own interests in some other way.  
In fact, the imposition of a fiduciary responsibility on the scientist and 
not the profiteer is counterproductive, since the scientist is more likely 
to contribute to the public interest than the profiteer. 
The impulse to saddle researchers with special duties to protect and 
serve their research subjects makes more sense when the origins of 
research ethics are taken into account.  When the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare wrote its famous “Belmont Report” 
setting out the best practices for research, it was writing for a 
predominantly medical audience.38  Indeed, the first part of the report, 
titled “Boundaries Between Practice and Research,” distinguishes 
research from therapeutic treatments and other services offered to 
“clients,” particularly medical patients.39  So, our contemporary 
research ethics come from the medical discipline.  Doctors do have 
special relationships with patients.  Any person engaged in the practice 
of medicine owes a wide range of legal duties to their patients whether 
they are engaged in research or not.40  So for doctor-researchers, their 
desire to produce generalizable knowledge can conflict with their 
independent and preexisting duties to advise and treat in the best 
interests of their patients.41 
Research conducted by companies, strangers, or other people who 
have no independent fiduciary duty should not trigger extra legal 
responsibilities, unless the person’s intent to study is likely to cause 
some harm to the interests or dignity of the research subjects. 
 
38. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 35, at 23193. 
39. Id. 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). 
41. Even within the class of researchers who do have pre-existing legal duties to serve the best 
interest of their patients, we may want to proceed with caution before imposing burdens or 
limitations on research when that research merely compares the effectiveness of equally 
appropriate treatments.  For a fascinating debate on the ethics of such “comparative effectiveness 
research studies,” see John D. Lantos & Chris Feudtner, SUPPORT and the Ethics of Study 
Implementation, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 30. 
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C. Does a Research Purpose Increase the Risk of Harm? 
Every person, whether they have a research motive or not, has the 
responsibility to refrain from conduct that imposes unjustified risks on 
others.  Identifying research risks in advance is no trivial task, since 
researchers often aim to explore the unknown.42  On the other hand, tort 
law has had centuries to develop practical legal solutions for the 
problem of unanticipated risks that can (and presumably do) shift 
liability to researchers who engage in unreasonably risky conduct.43  
But the risks and the harms addressed by tort law are limited to physical 
harms and a limited set of emotional and economic harms.  “Harms” in 
the discussion of research ethics generally, and the Facebook study in 
particular, are not so constrained. 
For example, some ethicists consider communications or conduct that 
force subjects to confront the “inadequacy of current medical 
knowledge” to be a harm caused by research.44  If a person can be 
“harmed” by having greater awareness about the current state of 
knowledge, virtually anything can be characterized as a harm.  This can 
put researchers in a state of paralysis as they consider an ocean of 
potential consequences. 
The commentary on the Facebook study illustrates how ambiguous 
and limited the concept of harm can be if we are not limited to the sorts 
of harms that are legally cognizable.  For example, James 
Grimmelmann argues that Facebook knowingly exposed its users to 
harm for no legitimate reason.45  According to Grimmelmann, 
Facebook’s attitude about its research goals could be summed up as: 
“We wanted to see if we could make you feel bad without you noticing.  
 
42. Even when a researcher goes in with a sensible hypothesis about the direction and scale of 
effects that one expects to see, the research may wind up showing that the risks are not what they 
seem.  See, e.g., Jena et al., supra note 23 (finding surprisingly positive effects when the best 
cardiologists in the country leave their post to attend a conference). 
43. Unusually dangerous or “ultrahazardous” activities are regulated using a strict liability 
rule.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519.  For most other conduct, courts use the 
negligence rule.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281–282 (1965).  A researcher will be 
held liable if a reasonable person, equipped with the background knowledge and experience that a 
person in his position should know, would conclude that the risks of the conduct outweigh its 
utility.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (2013). 
44. Marilyn Morris & Robert Nelson, Randomized, Controlled Trials as Minimal Risk: An 
Ethical Analysis, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 940, 943 (2007). 
45. Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood Manipulation 
Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive 
/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/ 
(quoting James Grimmelmann). 
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We succeeded.”46 
But Grimmelmann’s summary is misleading.  First, it isn’t clear 
Facebook should have known whether screening out positive content 
would make its users feel bad, as there is conflicting literature on the 
effects of emotional stimuli.47  Even assuming that they should have 
anticipated the small effect that they recorded, there are significant 
conceptual problems with identifying its conduct as harmful.  If 
Facebook “made” the group randomly assigned to the negative 
treatment “feel bad,” then Facebook also “made” the group randomly 
assigned to the positive treatment feel good.  It is intuitively appealing 
to say that the first experimental group was “harmed” while the second 
was made better off, but this quickly runs into the problem of baselines.  
If the positive treatment was “beneficial,” then the control group in the 
experiment was “harmed” by comparison.  That is, the News Feed as it 
existed at the time of the experiment—the one that almost every 
Facebook user saw—was causing more negative emotions than were 
technically necessary.  If Facebook has a general responsibility to use 
whatever means it has to prevent its users from feeling negative 
emotions, it would have to alter its News Feed to screen out more 
negative content.  If such a responsibility were to exist (and of course it 
does not), Facebook could not know how to optimize its algorithm to 
meet that responsibility without, well, research. 
Grimmelmann focused on the subsample of Facebook users whose 
results could bolster his argument that what Facebook did was wrong.48  
Grimmelmann’s conclusions, like those of most of the Facebook study 
critics, are dependent on treating the status quo as a good, or good 
enough, state of the world, and treating all changes as potentially 
abusive.  This puts undue emphasis on the difference between sins of 
omission and commission. 
Thus, while some research subjects experienced something other than 
what they would have under the control conditions, a rigorous account 
could not treat this as harm unless we are prepared to saddle Facebook 
with many more obligations (legal or moral) than it currently has.  
Facebook does not have a duty to keep us from feeling unpleasant 
emotions, and many people would find its attempt to do so 
 
46. Id. 
47. Indeed, it isn’t even clear that the group that had positive messages screened out of their 
News Feeds actually experienced negative emotions at all.  Michele Meyer et al., Misjudgments 
Will Drive Social Trials Underground, 511 NATURE 265 (2014). 
48. Id. 
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objectionable and intrusive. 
Instead of scrutinizing the intent of an actor for a desire to perform 
research, ethicists should demand responsible conduct from researchers 
given the current state of knowledge.  This shift would reduce the 
regulation and oversight of researchers.  But it would strengthen the 
protection of consumers from harm, whether the harm is caused by a 
researcher or by an actor with a different purpose. 
To illustrate, consider the “July effect.”  Every July, the emergency 
rooms in American teaching hospitals lose their most senior medical 
school residents and gain a slew of brand new first-year residents.  For 
years, many speculated that care is negatively affected by this abrupt 
shift from more-experienced to less-experienced residents.  Sure 
enough, a series of recent studies have documented that mortality, 
morbidity, and efficiency suffer during the academic year changeover.49  
Despite the consistent findings, teaching hospitals have done nothing to 
stagger start and end dates or to otherwise alleviate the July effect, and 
yet, their lack of action has not generated any lawsuits or appeals to 
regulators. 
But now imagine an alternate universe in which rotation into and out 
of teaching hospitals is already staggered.  Suppose a research team, 
curious to learn whether a more concentrated group of inexperienced 
residents would meaningfully change patient outcomes, randomly 
assigned half the country’s teaching hospitals to switch to the system we 
have today, forcing all new residents to start on the same day.  This 
experiment and its tragic, predictable results would be a scandal of epic 
proportions.  And yet, this is the unconsented experiment to which we 
all belong today.  Although our hospitals operate without a research 
purpose, the effects of their operations have the same grizzly effects that 
they would if the July turnover was an elaborate study.  If the research 
would be scandalous, current practices ought to scandalize us as well. 
A conduct-centered rule would mobilize ethicists and consumer 
protection organizations to focus on the risks produced by the 
researcher’s conduct rather than the vague impropriety of his intent.  
For the purposes of identifying harm, ethicists should ignore the 
research purpose, and treat the researcher as if he was acting with a 
business purpose, or for no particular purpose at all.  If the researcher 
exposes its subjects to legally cognizable harm, this exposure would 
 
49. John Q. Young et al., “July Effect”: Impact of the Academic Year-End Changeover on 
Patient Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 309 (2011). 
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raise a rebuttable presumption that the research conduct was unethical 
and illegal.50  Conversely, if an actor could engage in identical conduct 
without exposing others to legally cognizable harm, the ethical 
considerations should not change if the act is done in the quest for 
generalizable knowledge.  The baseline for assessing whether research 
poses risks to its research subjects therefore has to be external to the 
experiment, based on a minimum level of respect and care that people 
owe to each other. 
To be clear, a rule that alters research ethics and law to analyze 
conduct alone, and that imposes no heightened standard for researchers, 
does come with its own risks.  By unbridling social science researchers 
from heightened responsibility to their subjects, social welfare could 
potentially suffer.  The change could induce a wave of research that has 
a decent chance of causing harm, but falls just short of illegality.  I have 
my doubts that increased research will cause a net detriment; it seems 
that the far greater influence on overall public welfare will be the just-
shy-of-illegal conduct that businesses undertake for direct profit-
motivated purposes.  But even if a conduct-driven rule induces too 
much science at the margins of legality, it is the marginal cases that 
should be scrutinized, and perhaps punished, based on the risks of 
concrete, legally cognizable harm that the researchers should have 
anticipated. 
Applying the conduct-centered rule to the Facebook study would 
work as so: Suppose Facebook changed its News Feed algorithm to 
screen out 10% of the positive content that users currently see for some 
economic, non-research purpose, without notifying its users.  Would the 
tweak be cause for legal action against Facebook?  Today, almost 
certainly not.51  If Facebook can make tweaks to its News Feed 
 
50. I suggest later in this Article that the researcher should be able to rebut this presumption if 
he reasonably expects the value of the research to outweigh its risks, if he had his research 
protocol reviewed and approved by an IRB, and if he followed all consent protocols required by 
the IRB.  This frame restructures IRBs to be safe harbors from liability risks. 
51. Algorithm tweaks are well within the range of conduct expected by Internet firms, and are 
unlikely to cause serious emotional distress, especially since Facebook does not remove any 
content.  Thus, a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the closest source of 
redress a user might seek, would fail the “outrageous conduct” element at the very least.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).  Changes to algorithms may in the future be the 
subject of antitrust law, but so far the Federal Trade Commission has declined to treat similar 
algorithms (like those that produce Google’s search results) as a target for antitrust regulation. 
Craig Timberg, FTC: Google Did Not Break Antitrust Law with Search Results, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/ftc-to-announce-google-sett 
lement-today/2013/01/03/ecb599f0-55c6-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f_story.html. 
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algorithm without causing any legal harm, then it should also be able to 
test the tweaks, learn from the tests, and share the results with the 
general public. 
D. Is a Research Purpose an Affront to Autonomy? 
The previous two Sections have shown that potential conflicts of 
interest and potential harms can and should be managed through legal 
regimes designed specifically for those problems—fiduciary duties and 
conduct-based liability rules, respectively.  These problems can arise in 
the course of research, but they are orthogonal to the one key feature 
that all research has in common—the purpose to produce generalizable 
knowledge. 
The one putative concern left to consider, and the only concern linked 
directly to the definition of research, is the autonomy interests of 
research subjects.  The Belmont Report places a premium on the 
responsibility for researchers to respect the autonomy of research 
subjects, and that responsibility is closely tied to the obligation for 
researchers to provide notice and consent before engaging in an 
intervention.52 
To show lack of respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that 
person’s considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act 
on those considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to 
make a considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to 
do so.53 
The idea is vibrantly captured by the many commentaries that 
criticized Facebook for turning its users into “guinea pigs,” “lab rats,” 
and other vermin.54  The strong implication from the commentary, if not 
from the Belmont Report itself, is that a research subject’s right to 
autonomy is nearly absolute, making way for research interests only if 
there are “compelling reasons to do so.”55  As intuitively appealing as 
 
52. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 35, at 23193, 23195. 
53. Id. 
54. Editorial, Facebook’s ‘Research’ Turns Users Into Guinea Pigs, BOS. GLOBE (July 7, 
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/07/06/facebook-research-turns-user 
s-into-guinea-pigs/88PW0au3owuJwI9iO6oYAI/story.html; Dino Grandoni, You May Have Been 
a Lab Rat in a Huge Facebook Experiment, HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2014), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/29/facebook-experiment-psychological_n_5540018.html; Darlene 
Storm, Was Facebook & OKCupid’s Research Treating Users Like Guinea Pigs Illegal?, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 24, 2014, 11:09 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2687383 
/was-facebook-and-okcupid-s-research-treating-users-like-guinea-pigs-illegal.html. 
55. THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 35, at 23193 (describing the obligation to respect 
research subject autonomy). 
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this autonomy interest may be, it would impose great costs to a 
cooperative society.  All Americans live longer, healthier, and happier 
lives because of the research that has come before, so an enforceable 
demand to refuse to contribute to future research would invite breaches 
to the implicit social contract.  Moreover, it has never been clear how 
the strong version of autonomy elucidated in the Belmont Report and 
adopted by most research ethicists can be balanced with other important 
commitments, such as the right to scientific advancement in the U.N.’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.56 
Now that social science research can be done faster, cheaper, and 
more rigorously than ever, it is high time to reconsider the strong form 
of autonomy that currently guides research policy.  Outside of the 
contexts considered in the last two Sections (special relationships and 
heightened risks of legally cognizable harm), the law does not impose a 
general duty to ensure that others are fully informed about the 
environment and circumstances in which they operate.  That is, there is 
no legal obligation to refrain from manipulating each other.  Indeed, 
attempts to even define what separates a bad “manipulation” from a 
proper and ordinary human interaction often fail.  Where formal 
definitions are offered, they often rely on abstract concepts that are 
difficult to apply to real-world problems. 
Consider the definition of harmful manipulation that Cass Sunstein 
recently proposed in an article with the unfortunate title “Fifty Shades 
of Manipulation.”57  Sunstein argues that the telltale signs of harmful 
manipulation are (1) the manipulator is motivated by self-interest; and 
(2) the manipulation is designed to avoid cognitive reasoning.58  Greater 
degrees of these factors should give ethicists and regulators more cause 
for alarm, because if a manipulator wishes to interact with a target in a 
way that serves his (the manipulator’s) interests, the fact that the 
manipulator avoids the target’s awareness and autonomous choice may 
be a sign that the interaction is not mutually beneficial.59 
Putting aside plausible objections to the fuzziness of each of the test’s 
prongs, Sunstein’s model can be faulted for sweeping too broadly.  
Because time and attention are important resources, some interactions 
that strongly meet both of Sunstein’s factors may nevertheless leave the 
 
56. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, J. BEHAV. MARKETING (forthcoming 
2015). 
58. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
59. Id. (manuscript at 8). 
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manipulated and the general public better off.  But even using this over-
inclusive definition of harmful manipulation, the Facebook study 
(which Sunstein cites as an edge case60) ought to fail the test. 
Sunstein’s test relies on an implicit assumption that the manipulator 
can anticipate that his target will act or react in a certain way, and aims 
to exploit this propensity.  Research has exactly the opposite implicit 
assumption.  Even if a researcher can use background knowledge or 
pilot studies to anticipate a possible range of effects, the motivation for 
bona fide research is to explore and document the aspects of a 
phenomenon that are unknown at the time of the intervention (the scale 
or robustness of an effect, for example), not to produce a particular 
outcome. 
This clash in underlying assumptions has critical consequences to 
both parts of Sunstein’s test.  First, the definition of “self-interest” 
would have to be capacious if it were to include research.61  While 
research may eventually inure to Facebook’s benefit, those benefits 
would be indirect and delayed.  Facebook’s stated intent for performing 
the research was to improve its users’ emotional health—a goal that 
more directly helps Facebook’s users than Facebook itself.62  But even 
if Facebook had a less helpful, more profit-oriented goal—if the 
research had been undertaken to increase advertising click-through 
rates, for example63—the research was a gamble.  The tested 
intervention could have had a negative impact on click-through rates, 
and may have proven to interfere with Facebook’s interests as compared 
to the control setting. 
Facebook’s production of publicly available research made its 
research endeavors even less compatible with the “self-interest” prong 
of Sunstein’s test.  Facebook could have treated its research as a 
proprietary trade secret so that it could exploit the results without the 
scrutiny of its competitors and the general public.  Instead, Facebook 
shared its findings with the larger research community and the general 
public. 
The second prong fairs no better.  It may seem that Facebook avoided 
its users’ cognitive reasoning by failing to notify the users in the 
 
60. Id. (manuscript at 17). 
61. And it if it is sufficiently capacious, every human interaction would qualify outside the 
small set of genuine, wholly altruistic actions. 
62. Adam D. I. Kramer, FACEBOOK (June 29, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/akramer/ 
posts/10152987150867796. 
63. Thereby allowing Facebook to command a higher price from advertisers. 
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experimental groups that their News Feeds looked different from other 
users’ News Feeds.  However, good policy cannot demand notice for 
every single change to the status quo, especially where, as here, the 
effects of the change are unknown.  Sunstein recognizes that human 
behavior and choices are frequently the product of factors that do not 
involve any “reflective deliberation” on the part of the subject.64  So, he 
limits his definition of manipulation to changes in some variable that are 
likely to induce a particular behavior without the subject having a “fair 
chance” to deliberate on the variable.65 
Some research is likely to induce particular behavior.  If the 
researcher has access to enough background knowledge and 
information, he may be able to predict the likely effect for at least some 
subjects.66  Even in this subset of cases, it isn’t clear that research 
conducted in a good faith effort to learn (rather than done for the 
purpose of inducing the behavior) could meet this second element. 
In the case of the Facebook Emotion Contagion study, Facebook and 
its collaborators probably did not have sufficient prior knowledge to 
know how users would react.  As Michelle Meyer has pointed out, 
academic studies have come to inconsistent conclusions about the 
effects of hearing positive (or negative) news from our friends.67  Some 
studies have found that exposure to positive posts makes people less 
happy68—an effect that seems to run in the opposite direction of the 
Facebook study.69  Thus, however obvious the results of Facebook’s 
study may seem in retrospect, Facebook was as ignorant as the rest of us 
about whether the changes it made to the News Feed algorithm would 
play any role in human behavior.  Contrary to the accusations, Facebook 
did not “change their News Feed in order to manipulate their [users’] 
 
64. Sunstein, supra note 57 (manuscript at 6). 
65. Id. 
66. Even for this research, though, if it is unlikely to cause legally cognizable harm and is 
undertaken in a good faith effort to produce general knowledge, the first prong should fail. 
67. Meyer et al., supra note 47. 
68. Hui-Tzu Grace Chou & Nicholas Edge, “They Are Happier and Having Better Lives than 
I am”: The Impact of Using Facebook on Perceptions of Others’ Lives, 15 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, 
BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 117 (2012); Nina Haferkamp & Nicole C. Kramer, Social 
Comparison 2.0: Examining the Effects of Online Profiles on Social-Networking Sites, 14 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 309 (2010); Ethan Kross et al., Facebook 
Use Predicts Declines in Subjective Well-Being in Young Adults, 8 PLOS ONE e69841 (2013). 
69. The studies can be reconciled with the Emotion Contagion study if Facebook users tend to 
feel worse when learning about the successes of their friends while simultaneously posting more 
positive posts.  This outcome would be quite consistent with the social comparison theories 
explored in the earlier research. 
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emotional state”70 because it could not have known, at the time, whether 
they would need to include more or fewer positive posts in the News 
Feed to induce the desired effect. 
To be clear, Facebook’s downstream use of research findings may fit 
Sunstein’s definition of harmful manipulation very well.  If Facebook 
decides to exploit what it has learned in a way that surreptitiously serves 
its interests and puts its users at some disadvantage, the ethical and legal 
questions will be ripe.  If Facebook, armed with its research findings, 
changes its algorithm in order to reach some particular distasteful end—
to depress people into shopping more or to change voting behavior in a 
local election, for example—then the public and the regulators will have 
important choices to make about whether these types of nudges should 
be banned.  But while eventual use and advantage motivates corporate 
research, the research itself is an investment—a cost undertaken with 
little expected benefits until the research is complete.  These initial steps 
to test unproven theories and discover new insights are prerequisites to 
all evidence-based practices, good and evil, mutually beneficial and not. 
For this reason, I have taken some care to use the term “intervention” 
in this Essay rather than the term “manipulation”—a word frequently 
used in the press coverage of the Facebook Emotion Contagion study.71  
To the extent the word “manipulation” is meant to carry a suggestion of 
exploitation, the term is inapt.  Exploitation will depend on what 
Facebook does next, now that it knows the results of its studies. 
E. To Intervene Is Human 
There is another problem with the definition of “intervention” used 
by research ethicists and by the Department of Health and Human 
Services.72  We all experiment every day in an intervention sort of way, 
 
70. Meyer et al., supra note 47. 
71. Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science, FORBES (June 
28, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/28/facebook-manipulated-
689003-users-emotions-for-science/; Michael Hilzik, Facebook’s User Manipulation Study: Why 
You Should Be Very Afraid, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-facebooks-user-20140630-column.html; Jaron Lanier, Should Facebook 
Manipulate Users?, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/ 
jaron-lanier-on-lack-of-transparency-in-facebook-study.html?_r=0; Natasha Lennard, OkCupid 
and Facebook Aren’t the Only Ones Manipulating You, but That’s No Excuse, VICE (July 29, 
2014, 3:25 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/okcupid-and-facebook-arent-the-only-ones-manipu 
lating-you-but-thats-no-excuse. 
72. The Department of Health and Human Services defines “interventions” to mean 
“manipulations of the subject or the subject’s environment that are performed for research 
purposes.”  45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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and it typically flies well under the radar of formal categorization as an 
experimental intervention.  People, being exceptionally socially 
intelligent animals, often change how they tell stories or make requests 
based on the poor performance of past attempts.  When they make 
changes to their stories and their pleas to try out another style, they do 
so without obtaining informed consent from their audiences. 
Consider a less frivolous example.  When a doctor chooses a 
treatment for a patient with a certain set of symptoms and health factors, 
he will naturally be very interested to know what happens to the patient 
so that he can learn and adjust his practice for other patients with similar 
characteristics.  This is a small, low-quality, ad hoc experiment.  If he 
changes his practice and chooses a different, equally reasonable 
treatment option, one would not only permit, but also expect, the doctor 
to compare the experiences of his patients, and adjust his practice 
accordingly.  Yet if this same doctor has ten patients with similar 
conditions and backgrounds, and if the doctor consciously prescribes his 
default treatment to half and a different, equally reasonable treatment to 
the other half, he would be engaged in illegal and unethical research. 
This example shows the line differentiating a research “intervention” 
(for which notice and consent is often required) and ordinary life is 
more obscure, and even less principled, than it first seems.73  Harboring 
a research interest does not do enough to separate acceptable treatment 
practices from unethical secret research.  Every doctor, and every 
person, has an interest and a habit of observing the consequences of 
their actions and generalizing from what they observe. 
A careful reading of the Belmont Report, the federal research 
regulations, and the criticism of the Facebook study reveals that a 
distrusted research intervention is not just an investigatory intervention, 
but a “systematic” one.74  The less formal and sound an experiment is—
the less fair, deliberate, or evenhanded its implementation—the greater 
its moral and legal acceptance. 
A doctor who delivers care and advice to his patients based on 
random assignment into control and treatment groups without explicit 
research-related consent would be engaged in unethical and potentially 
 
73. Anna Laakmann has described how the uncertain distinction between research and 
medical care has led to more conservative care, possibly to the detriment of medical progress.  
Anna Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 913, 
934–38 (2015). 
74. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (definition of “research”). 
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illegal behavior.75  And yet, where both treatment options are equally 
legal, effective, and safe based on the best evidence we have, there is 
little reason to punish the doctor who formalizes his experimentation 
into a sounder and more socially valuable exercise.  Indeed, the 
formalizing of the experimentation should be a more ethical response to 
the inescapable problem of incomplete knowledge, since it will more 
quickly reveal if one treatment is more efficacious or dangerous than the 
other.  One may legitimately wonder, as a few ethicists have, whether 
the dominant theory of research ethics has the framing backwards; 
perhaps we should wonder whether it is ethical to not engage in 
research where gaps in knowledge have produced a range of options in 
clinical equipoise.76 
The Facebook Emotion Contagion study sits in the same posture.  
Facebook’s continued use of the original, default News Feed algorithm 
would have been acceptable even though neither Facebook nor its users 
knew much about how its current algorithm affected mood.  Facebook 
also could have chosen to change the algorithm to screen out more 
positive or more negative messages.  Doing any of these things for a 
business reason or for no particular reason would have been perfectly 
ethical under the conventional wisdom.  But doing these things in a 
more designed way to quickly and efficiently learn from them caused 
the conduct to be categorized as inappropriate research.  The difference 
cannot be the effects; changing the algorithm (or failing to do so) will 
cause their effects all the same.77  The difference cannot be the intent to 
change the algorithm; Facebook’s alterations to its algorithm would be 
deliberate in either case.  The difference must be Facebook’s intent to 
learn. 
Unfortunately, the misguided instinct to restrict systematic and 
rigorous research is baked into the American law of IRBs.  As the next 
Part will explain, the strongest legal objections to the Facebook 
Emotion Contagion study are based on Facebook’s collaborators at 
 
75. And sometimes, even when consent is received, random assignment will nevertheless be 
treated as per se unethical conduct.  See Lantos & Feudtner, supra note 41 (describing 
controversy of a medical study where consent was obtained during a time of high stress). 
76. Michele Meyer calls the resistance to randomized controlled trials “the A/B Illusion,” 
urging ethicists to reconsider research rules that overprotect “subjects” while underprotecting 
“users.”  Meyer, supra note 3, at 321–22.  This problem is also what George Lawton meant by his 
title “Why Is it Ethical Not to Test for Emotional Impact?”  Lawton, supra note 10. 
77. Danah Boyd’s thoughtful commentary has also criticized the distinction between research 
and ordinary business practices.  Boyd, supra note 11.  She concludes that the outrage is better 
directed at general practices in Big Data rather than the research-related manipulations.  Id. 
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Cornell using a regulatory loophole in the IRB requirements.  These 
objections do a better job showing the absurdities in our laws than they 
do in illuminating the dangers of Facebook’s research. 
IV.  TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS WITH IRB LAW 
While Facebook took a few lumps in the popular press following the 
publication of the Emotion Contagion study, the academic researchers 
at Cornell actually bared the most serious legal and reputational risks.  
Outrage about the study, which first prompted a muddle of objections, 
eventually found its attack surface in the dull formalities of IRBs.   
Federal research regulations (known as the “Common Rule”) require 
institutions engaged in research to set up IRBs to review and approve 
research plans before they are carried out.  Facebook is under no legal 
obligation to comply with the Common Rule, though, because the scope 
of the regulation covers only entities that receive federal grants.78  But 
the Cornell researchers were subjected to unprecedented scrutiny of 
their compliance with the federal regulations and with Cornell’s internal 
rules. 
The Cornell authors structured the research in a strategic way that 
some have dubbed “IRB laundering”.79  The academic researchers gave 
some input to Facebook before the experiment was conducted, but left it 
to Facebook to actually implement the study.  The Cornell researchers 
then collected the data after the experiment was complete.  This allowed 
the researchers to characterize their research as an analysis of existing 
data, which is either “not human subjects research” at all or is research 
exempt from the federal Common Rule.80  There is no general 
consensus about whether this type of research structure complies with 
 
78. 45 C.F.R § 46.101(a) (2009). 
79. Meeting Notes, Council for Big Data, Ethics & Society, http://bdes.datasociety.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/minutes-2014-11-14.pdf (calling the Facebook Emotion Contagion 
study a “research scandal”); James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social 
Media Users, 13 COLO. TECH. L. J. 219 (2015) (calling it “IRB laundering”); Polonetsky & Tene, 
supra note 30 (using the same “IRB laundering” language). 
80. Even if the analysis of data is considered human subjects research, it is exempt from 
formal IRB review as long as the data is de-identified.  45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4).  Note that there 
is great confusion about whether analysis of already-collected data is not “research” at all or is 
research, but is exempt because the definition of the (b)(4) exemption would not even qualify as 
human subjects research using the Department of Health and Human Services’s definition and 
guidance for human subjects research.  See Human Subjects Regulations Decision Charts, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/checklists/ 
decisioncharts.html (charts 1 and 5). 
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the Common Rule;81 but Cornell’s IRB ultimately confirmed that the 
researchers’ decision to characterize their analyses of Facebook data as 
not human subjects research was appropriate.82 
Nevertheless, the excessive focus on IRB protocols drew a striking 
irony: the most legally exposed people involved in the Emotion 
Contagion study were the academic researchers, not Facebook 
employees.  Even PNAS, the journal that published the study, distanced 
itself from the Cornell authors by formally noting its concern for the 
ethics and propriety of the researchers’ choice to proceed without 
informed consent.83  The Cornell authors were forced to play the role of 
ceremonial whipping boys to address the collective anger. 
The debate about whether the Cornell researchers did or did not 
exploit a regulatory loophole is a distraction.  It is mostly irrelevant to 
the larger question of research ethics, because, even if the researchers 
had submitted an application for IRB review in advance of the 
experiment, the low risk and low stakes of the study would have 
qualified the study for either exempt status or expedited review 
anyways,84 and they almost certainly would have been permitted to 
proceed without informed consent.85  This is sensible, because specific 
consent would have tainted the study by alerting the Facebook users 
about the emotional valence of the posts displayed in their News 
Feeds.86 
 
81. Michelle Meyer, How an IRB Could Have Legitimately Approved the Facebook 
Experiment—and Why That May Be a Good Thing, FAC. LOUNGE (June 29, 2014, 11:05 PM), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/06/how-an-irb-could-have-legitimately-approved-the-face 
book-experimentand-why-that-may-be-a-good-thing.html; Duncan J. Watts, Lessons Learned 
from the Facebook Study, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9, 2014), http://chronicle.com/blogs/con 
versation/2014/07/09/lessons-learned-from-the-facebook-study/. 
82. John Carberry, Media Statement on Cornell University’s Role in Facebook ‘Emotion 
Contagion’ Research, CORNELL U. MEDIA REL. OFF. (June 30, 2014), http://mediarelations. 
cornell.edu/2014/06/30/media-statement-on-cornell-universitys-role-in-facebook-emotional-conta 
gion-research. 
83. Inder M. Verma, Editorial Expression of Concern and Correction, 111 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 10779 (2014). 
84. 45 C.F.R § 46.110; 63 Fed. Reg. 63,60364 (Nov. 9, 1998) (describing research eligible for 
expedited review). 
85. For example, an earlier intervention-based research on 14 million Facebook users was 
permitted to proceed without informed consent by a University of North Carolina researcher.  See 
Dan Diamond, The Outrage Over Facebook’s ‘Creepy’ Experiment Is Out-of-Bounds—And This 
Study Proves It, FORBES (July 1, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/20 
14/07/01/the-outrage-over-facebooks-creepy-experiment-is-out-of-bounds-and-this-study-proves-
it/ (describing IRB approval). 
86. Clifford Lampe, Facebook Is Good for Science, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 8, 2014), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2014/07/08/facebook-is-good-for-science/.  Specific 
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The federal Common Rule and IRBs have a role to play in high-risk 
research.  They were, after all, inspired by research initiatives like the 
Tuskegee syphilis study87 (in which the researchers deliberately 
withheld standard syphilis treatment to a community of African 
Americans).  Moreover, some modern forms of aggressive research 
need a process for independent review to ensure that the researchers are 
not blinded by ambition or conflicts of interest when imposing risky 
experiments on their subjects.  Clinical trials, for example, will 
frequently expose their research subjects to substantial risks to run 
down a hope that a new drug will be effective.88  But these archetype 
examples are serious interventions.  Importantly, if a doctor engaged in 
these behaviors without an interest in scientific discovery, the behavior 
would still put the doctor at risk of legal liability and professional 
sanction.89 
Facebook does not conduct aggressive research.  Facebook could 
have changed its News Feed algorithm at any time for a range of 
reasons.  The controversy stemmed from, and solely from, the 
company’s interest in learning from the changes, and sharing the results 
with the public.  When IRB rules interfere with non-risky conduct (as 
opposed to reviewing conduct that is risky but may be worth the risks), 
the rules hinder research for no principled reason. 
V.  CORRECTING OUR ANTI-RESEARCH RESEARCH LAW 
In the end, the Facebook controversy illustrated three regrettable 
truths about the current state of research policy.  First, a company is at a 
disadvantage if it works with researchers at an academic institution, 
because the project may run into legal or public perception problems 
related to IRBs.  Second, a company is more likely to provoke public 
criticism and increased regulator scrutiny if it formalizes and carefully 
tests its theories about consumer behavior rather than operating on the 
basis of assumption, conventional wisdom, or hunch.  And third, a 
company is much better off hoarding its findings rather than sharing 
 
consent is likely to cause selection bias and priming effects. 
87. The Tuskegee Timeline, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm. 
88. FAQ: ClinicalTrials.gov—Benefits and Risks of Clinical Trials, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
(Oct. 11 2006), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctbenefits.html. 
89. Laakmann, supra note 73; Mark Geistfeld, Does Tort Law Stifle Innovative Medical 
Treatments?, TORTS JOTWELL (June 2, 2015), http://torts.jotwell.com/does-tort-law-stifle-inno 
vative-medical-treatments/ (describing how current law permits some, but not all, deviations from 
customary practice). 
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them with the general public. 
Many of these problems fall in the domain of public norms.  Those 
norms are unlikely to shift as long as the social science community 
itself fails to defend researchers like the Cornell group who become 
ensnared in controversy.90  As long as social scientists continue to 
accept the customary set of research ethics uncritically, there is little 
reason to think that the general public will feel differently.  However, 
adjustments in the law could start to influence the norms. 
The federal Common Rule should be reformed to realign researcher 
incentives with sensible research practices.  Today, even social science 
research that is exempt from IRB review must go through a process 
(sometimes an elaborate one) to establish that the research is exempt.91  
Consequently, the federal rules and their implementation consistently 
nudge researchers away from performing new work, even when that 
work poses no danger.  Instead, the Common Rule should function as a 
safe harbor—a mechanism that can allow researchers to engage in 
conduct that would normally put them at some risk of legal sanction, 
employment termination, or grant defunding.92  Naturally, researchers 
would seek to be protected by the safe harbor when their research may 
create some risks of harm to the research subject.  Thus, the spirit of the 
Common Rule would remain largely intact.  Researchers would seek to 
protect their own interests from the fallout of any experimentation that 
 
90. I join a small but growing chorus of scholars urging regulators and ethicists to reconsider 
the dominant philosophies.  ZACHARY M. SCHRAG, ETHICAL IMPERIALISM: INSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW BOARDS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1965-2009 (2010); Philip Hamburger, The New 
Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (2006); Meyer et al., supra note 47 
(signed by twenty-eight ethicists, at http://www.michellenmeyer.com/co-authors-and-signatories-
of-statement-on-facebook-experiment-published-in-nature.html); David Orentlicher, Making 
Research a Requirement of Treatment: Why We Should Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients 
to Participate in Research, HASTINGS CTR, REP., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 20; Michael Bernstein, The 
Destructive Silence of Social Computing Researchers, MEDIUM (July 7, 2014), https://medium 
.com/@msbernst/the-destructive-silence-of-social-computing-researchers-9155cdff659; Philip 
Hamburger, The Censorship You’ve Never Heard Of, COMMENTARY MAG. (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-censorship-youve-never-heard-of/. 
91. See, e.g., Levels of Review, U. CAL. IRVINE OFF. RES., http://www.research.uci.edu/comp 
liance/human-research-protections/researchers/levels-of-review.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) 
(requiring review of “exempt” research). 
92. The self-regulated corporate IRBs described by Calo, Tene, and Polonetsky could function 
as self-imposed requirements for research divisions within a company, and employees could be 
terminated for cause if they violate the internal rules.  See Calo, supra note 3 (describing model 
for self-regulated corporate IRBs); Polonetsky & Tene, supra note 30 (describing model for self-
regulated corporate IRBs).  This system would work outside public law except in the sense that 
states that have not adopted at-will employment may formally recognize violations of corporate 
IRBs as cause for termination. 
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exposes its subjects to even a remote chance of harm. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I hope to explore in future work how IRB policies can better resolve 
the tension between the public’s interest in promoting research and 
promoting subject safety and autonomy.  It is no doubt obvious from 
this short Essay that I disagree with the legal scholarship that has used 
the controversial Facebook Emotion Contagion study to promote the 
expansion of the Common Rule and IRB review.  Contemporary 
research ethics cannot provide any coherent account for our profound 
distrust in systematized research.  Unless those theoretical flaws are 
resolved, restrictive regulations of research should be modest. 
